My Analysis of the Analysis on the Gamification Article

Thanks to everyone who commented on the latest article that Jarret and I published in Foreign Policyon how the online militant Islamist world has been increasingly “gamifying” their users’ experiences. This post will respond to some of the analysis offered by Jihadica’s Will McCants and J.M. Berger over at Intelwire. 

The purpose of our FP piece was to offer a more developed lens for understanding a series of trends that counterterrorism analysts have been anecdotally observing for some time. It’s no surprise that gaming techniques make mundane activities more fun. Nor is it a surprise that they have been implicitly present within the online jihadist movement for years.  Where our article advances the conversation is by showing the ways in which English-language militant Islamist forums are now explicitly integrating game mechanics into the structure of their online architecture. The obvious implication of systematically employing these mechanics into the forums is that it offers users a more engaging experience, which means they will spend more time on the forums talking about more things related to militancy. 

McCants brings an important perspective to the article. For McCants, our gamification framework applied less well to Awlaki. We agree. We don’t see Awlaki as having gamified his blog with the same intentionality or transparency that frequent flier miles, for instance, may encourage consumers to accept sub-optimal flight schedules in order to earn elite status. The beauty of Awlaki’s approach is how intuitive and organic it seemed to be: he created a gamified system without really even trying. Awlaki didn’t need expressly defined prizes, like most forums have today. Instead, Awlaki made himself the prize and his lectures the virtual currency to gather, exchange and discuss. 

Berger usefully expands on a point we had made in his response by arguing that when an individual gets closer to violent action, they start losing “rep power” and influence in the forums. This is an issue that needs to be explored further. I don’t think the example of Zachary Chesser works in this case, however, as Berger contends. Berger correctly notes that Chesser was eventually banned from the Islamic Awakening forum and moved most of his online presence to Al Qimmah. However, Al Qimmah also employs game mechanics, as do other sites Chesser was active on before his arrest, including Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum. Of course Al Qimmah and Ansar are far more militant sites than Islamic Awakening, but the point is that users will find the appropriate site to express their extremist ideologies – and almost all of these sites employ game mechanics to encourage increased user participation.

Berger also reports that after Chesser’s arrest, Islamic Awakening members “hosted a roast,” which I would argue is a major exaggeration. Even the post Berger uses as an example, where a user accuses Chesser of having “loose lips,” the user ends his post by saying “Make dua for him and I'm going to see if his wife/child are doing ok.” Despite accusations that Chesser was not wise in the way he spoke, most users still assumed he was innocent and encouraged others to pray for him and his family. That being said, I still think Berger’s argument deserves more thought and I plan to explore it further. 

I want to thank everyone again for their comments. This article has opened up some great discussions and I hope we continue to debate and explore these issues further. Most importantly, I hope that we can go forward with this new framework and develop it into an argument that will help us both understand and combat virtual extremism crossing over into violence.

The World of Holy Warcraft

Jarret Brachman and I published a new article in Foreign Policy yesterday on how al Qaeda has gamified the movement. You can read it here: The World of Holy Warcraft. 

In the article we conclude that the fervor of online jihadists is actually quite similar to the fervor of any other online group, and this is partly a result of the use of gamification on online 

social spaces. In the same way that you can “like” a Facebook post or “retweet” on Twitter, members of an online forum can now “thank” someone for their post or give them a positive reputation power. To further a user’s engagement, the more “rep power” or “thanks” one collects, the quicker they can amass all the rankings, scores, badges, and levels to prove their increase in reputation. Competition is key here.

Anyone who thinks they aren’t affected by gamification - i.e. applying game-like attributes to non-game activities - is wrong. If you've used frequent-flier miles, earned stars with your coffee purchase at Starbucks, or checked in on Foursquare, you've had a gamified experience. Gamification is merely the tool used to increase engagement among individuals that may not otherwise have 

been engaged.

What’s interesting is that one of the forums we wrote about has reposted the article (see right), and in the past 20 hours dozens of users have commented on the article - everything from anger to sarcasm to agreement, and even excitement about their newfound fame. To put it in Abu Hurairah’s words: “I love how in 16 minutes we've managed to post a page of posts - 5 of them in the last 2 minutes.” 

One user even took advantage of this thread to make a suggestion about repping and thanking in the forum. UmmAbdulMalikStorm said: “PS..i think we should get rid of reps and keep the thanks. There's more benefit in the thanks coz it keeps the repetitive "I agrees" at bay.”

Omar Hammami’s Rap Songs Aren’t So “Jihadi Cool”

Alabama native Omar Hammami, famous for his rap songs on behalf of Al Shabaab, released two new rap songs over the weekend. The first, in a clear effort to deride recent reports of his death, he prays for a drone attack or a cruise missile to kill him, rapping: “An amazing martyrdom I strive for and adore.” It is very typical of a terrorist to release a video or audio recording soon after the media reports that he may be dead, proving he is still alive. Hammami follows suit, even mocking the media reports further by rapping: 

There’s nothing as sweet as the taste of a tank shell

But it could be compared to being where the mortar fell

But all that could be seen as tasteless

Compared to smart bombs falling when they don’t miss

It was a beautiful day, when that predator paradise missile sent me on my way

A one way ticket with no stops or delays, no problems in the grave nor fear on that day

Or better yet send me a cruise, and send me on a cruise

Family rejoices at the news and follows me in what I do

In the second rap song, titled “Make Jihad with me,” Hammami dedicates the rap to the “Muslim youth in the West who are finding their way back to their glorious roots.” Here is the chorus:

Make Jihad with me

Allahu Akbar give me some more bounty

Attack America Now

Martyrdom or victory

We takin’ Nairobi to Addis

Paradise insight

My Muslim brother bring your money and your life

Khalifah is here

We breakin’ down Gitmo

We Wipin’ Israel clear off the globe

Despite the straightforward and unwavering lyrics, while rapping these songs Hammami sounds unconvinced. Stumbling over some of the lyrics, and clearly uncomfortable with his rapping skills, these songs are just not so “jihadi cool.” Telling of these unimpressionable rap songs is the lack of reaction to them in the forums and on social networking sites. Can you imagine the impact a similar release would make in the forums if it was from say, Anwar al-Awlaki, instead of Omar Hammami??  

As an experiment, I searched posts on Facebook today for “Hammami,” and not one person has shared either of his rap songs yet. In a search for “Awlaki,” twelve different people have linked to Awlaki videos since yesterday. Remember, Awlaki hasn’t come out with a new lecture since February. 

The differences between Awlaki and Hammami are substantial, and Hammami makes many of them clear in his rap songs. To name a few: Hammami has no religious legitimacy, he is considerably less confident when he speaks/raps, he is trying too hard to be “cool,” and he did not first gain a following in the West before moving abroad and attempting to recruit others to jihad. In other words, when comparing Awlaki to Hammami in a case study, Awlaki’s path to fame worked, while Hammami’s is miserably failing.